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THIRD CIRCUIT CONFIRMS THE CLASS 
ARBITRATION “CLEAR AND 
UNMISTAKABLE” STANDARD IN 
CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA, LLC v. SCOUT 
PETROLEUM, LLC, DEALING A BLOW TO 
CONSUMERS AND EMPLOYEES 
Abstract: Whether class action is available in an arbitration proceeding is a high-
ly controversial topic with implications for all parties bound by such clauses. Due 
to the high stakes of class action arbitrability, it is essential that a neutral deci-
sionmaker determine this question. Whether this decisionmaker is the court or 
the arbitrator, however, is contested and unresolved by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Although undetermined by our highest court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit has addressed this question. In Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. 
Scout Petroleum, LLC, the Third Circuit affirmed that the availability of class ar-
bitration is a question for the courts, unless there is clear and unmistakable lan-
guage within the arbitration clause delegating such a power to the arbitrators. 
Further, the court held that an incorporation of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion rules is not a clear and unmistakable delegation. Although this opinion in-
centivizes contract clarity, it also ignores the uneven bargaining power and diver-
gent interests between parties in modern mandatory arbitration agreements, hand-
ing a windfall victory for corporations. 
INTRODUCTION 
American citizens are currently entwined in tens of millions of contracts 
that contain arbitration clauses.1 Arbitration agreements, prevalent in credit 
card, employment, and student loan contracts, strip the court of jurisdiction 
over disputes arising out of a contract and require such disputes to be heard 
before a panel of neutral arbiters.2 Although arbitration is becoming an in-
                                                                                                                           
 1 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY § 1.4.1, at 9 (2015); see Jessica Silver-
Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-
stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/LVG7-H4Z6]. 
 2 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 1, § 1.4.1, at 10; Lauren Guth Barnes, How 
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Waivers Undermine Consumer Rights and Why 
We Need Congress to Act, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 336 (2015) (highlighting the wide breadth 
of industries that adopt arbitration clauses); Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 1 (highlighting 
that arbitration agreements are found in many different types of contracts). 
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creasingly popular method of dispute resolution, the system has recently come 
under fire for its stifling impediments on class action claims.3 Many arbitration 
clauses either preclude, or are silent on, class action.4 These restrictions have 
been challenged in court; however, many of the judicial branch’s decisions 
have benefited companies and employers by either upholding class action 
waivers or concluding that class arbitration is not available when not explicitly 
provided for in a contract.5 Without the ability to bring class claims, many oth-
erwise aggrieved persons have been unable or unwilling to bring claims 
against large companies due to the impracticalities of bilateral dispute resolu-
tion.6 As a consequence, companies that use such clauses, such as Verizon, 
AT&T, and American Express have saved millions, if not billions, of dollars to 
the detriment of the average citizen.7 
Class action arbitration is a complex topic defined by clashing legal poli-
cies: the purpose of arbitration is economic and procedural efficiency, but class 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the 
Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 125–26 (2002) (arguing that class action impedi-
ments as a result of arbitration agreements deprive plaintiff’s statutory rights); Silver-Greenberg & 
Gebeloff, supra note 1 (detailing how many consumers and employees are finding themselves unable 
to redress claims against companies because they are precluded from class arbitration). See generally 
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012) (providing the statutory authority to arbitrate dis-
putes). 
 4 See Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc. (Opalinski I), No. 10-CV-2069, 2011 WL 4729009, at *3 
(D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2011) (stating that the arbitration agreements were silent on the matter of class action); 
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses 
in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 884 (highlighting the om-
nipresence of class action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements); infra notes 38–52 and accom-
panying text (discussing how silence in a class action waiver often results in parties being precluded 
from the procedure). 
 5 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311–12 (2013) (holding that the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) does not allow courts to invalidate a class action arbitration waiver 
on the grounds that the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a claim outweighs the possible re-
covery); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343–44 (2011) (holding that California’s 
common law unconscionability doctrine is preempted by the FAA); Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. Animal-
Feeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (stating that parties cannot be forced to arbitrate through a 
class unless there is a contractual basis that the parties agreed to do so); Sarah Rudolph Cole, The 
Federalization of Consumer Arbitration: Possible Solutions, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 271, 272–75 
(2013) (explaining how the judicial branch has adopted a broad reading of the FAA so that the statute 
preempts states from regulation arbitration). 
 6 See Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Prepared Remarks at Arbitration Field 
Hearing (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/prepared-remarks-
cfpb-director-richard-cordray-field-hearing-arbitration-clauses/ [https://perma.cc/3FLT-DF3C] (stat-
ing that many consumers do not think it is rational to try and hire a lawyer to argue a small fee); By-
ron Allyn Rice, Enforceable or Not?: Class Action Waivers in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and the 
Need for a Judicial Standard, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 215, 247–48 (2008) (discussing the high costs and 
low rewards of bilateral arbitration). Specifically, in the consumer realm, a mere 616 arbitration cases 
are filed with the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) each year. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BU-
REAU, supra note 1, § 1.4.3, at 11. 
 7 Rice, supra note 6, at 248; Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 1. 
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action’s paramount concern is the protection of individual rights.8 Thus, parties 
in a contractual agreement often have starkly different opinions about whether 
class action should be available under valid arbitration agreements.9 This 
Comment discusses one facet of this debate: the availability of class action 
when an arbitration clause is silent on the matter.10 Part I of this Comment dis-
cusses background federal arbitration law and class action arbitration.11 Part II 
discusses two decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that 
categorized the availability of class action as a question of arbitrability.12 Part 
III explains how the Third Circuit’s decisions have further restricted the ability 
of parties to bring class action claims due to uneven bargaining power between 
companies and consumers.13 
I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND CLASS CLAIMS  
Although arbitration is becoming commonplace in a diverse set of con-
tracts, its statutory foundation and policy implications are widely debated.14 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344 (explaining that class action hinders the fundamental benefits 
of arbitration—speed and informality—and thus is inconsistent with the FAA); Sternlight, supra note 
3, at 8, 29–31 (highlighting that arbitration is commended for being a fast and cheap procedure, 
whereas class action is recognized for improving access to courts and enhancing the public interest). 
In other words, an arbitration proceeding focuses on resolving the dispute at hand in the most effi-
cient, often private, way possible. See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 8 (discussing why businesses prefer 
arbitration). A class action lawsuit, however, is more public, can take years to conclude, and often has 
public policy in mind. See id. at 29–31, 30 n.102; About Class Actions, SPECTOR ROSEMAN KODROFF 
& WILLIS, http://www.srkw-law.com/about-class-actions.html [https://perma.cc/7NVT-UCXB] (stat-
ing that class action lawsuits often take two to four years). Thus, the goals of arbitration and class 
action are often incompatible. See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 8, 29–31 (discussing the goals of arbi-
tration and class action). 
 9 See Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC (Chesapeake III), 809 F.3d 746, 
751 (3d Cir. 2016) (highlighting how the lessee, Chesapeake, did not believe class action was valid, 
whereas the lessor, Scout Petroleum, argued class action was an available avenue of redress); Wade 
Lambert, Class-Action Suit Is a Target for Criticism from All Sides, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 1996), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB829877425363143500 [https://perma.cc/R3SP-LF53] (comparing the 
views of critics and advocates of class action; critics claim it is a method for lawyers to bring frivolous 
lawsuits, whereas advocates argue it is a vital method protecting consumer and employee rights). 
 10 See infra notes 14–122 and accompanying text. Another facet of this debate is the use of class 
action waivers in arbitration agreements. See generally Joseph Fay et al., Class Action Waivers in 
Arbitration Provisions, in A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS 575 (Marcy Hogan Greer 
ed., 2010) (providing a general summary of class action waivers in arbitration agreements). Although 
this Comment does not focus on class action waivers, the topic is sporadically referred to throughout 
the work. See generally Matthew Harris, Comment, Riding the Waiver: In re American Express Mer-
chants’ Litigation and the Future of Vindication of Statutory Rights, 54 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 15 
(2013), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3282&context=bclr [https://
perma.cc/7T4B-6DEU] (discussing class action waivers and their implications on statutory rights). 
 11 See infra notes 14–52 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 53–95 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 96–122 and accompanying text. 
 14 See Chesapeake III, 809 F.3d at 753; Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 1 (detailing the 
types of consumer contracts that have arbitration contracts). Compare Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339 
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Section A of this Part provides a brief introduction to the foundation of arbitra-
tion and an overview of the court’s attempts to balance the system’s competing 
policies.15 Section B discusses class action and its role in the judicial system.16 
Section C highlights the uncertain role of class action in arbitration proceed-
ings, and how federal courts have addressed the matter.17 
A. Arbitration: A Balancing Act 
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which places arbitration agreements 
on an equal footing with other contracts, continues to be a contested piece of 
legislation with far-reaching implications.18 Much of the controversy surround-
ing the FAA has stemmed from the necessity to balance the goals of arbitration 
with the need for fair resolution of claims.19 On one hand, arbitration is an ef-
ficient, inexpensive method of resolving disputes, as it reduces procedure and 
preserves the judicial branch’s scarce resources.20 On the other hand, arbitra-
tion precludes parties from a jury trial and appellate review, which can lead to 
a lack of legitimacy and due process.21 Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has tried to interpret the FAA in a way that gives autonomy to the arbitration 
system while still permitting courts to intervene when legal rights may be at 
risk.22 Accordingly, courts retain jurisdiction over gateway issues, such as 
                                                                                                                           
(highlighting a broad interpretation of the FAA), with id. at 359 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (interpreting 
the FAA more narrowly). See generally Sternlight, supra note 3 (discussing the debate of arbitration 
clauses and class action). 
 15 See infra notes 18–27 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 28–37 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 38–52 and accompanying text. 
 18 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012); see Chesapeake III, 809 F.3d at 753 (discussing the disagreement 
over whether class action arbitrability is a question of procedure or arbitrability). Compare Concep-
cion, 563 U.S. at 339 (highlighting a broad interpretation of the FAA), with id. at 359 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (interpreting the FAA more narrowly), and Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 1 
(detailing the types of consumer contracts that have arbitration contracts). See generally Sternlight, 
supra note 3 (discussing the debate of arbitration clauses and class action). 
 19 See Thomas Carbonneau, At the Crossroads of Legitimacy and Arbitral Autonomy, 16 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 213, 221 (2005) (highlighting the questions a court faces when regulating arbitration, 
as the regulations should promote both effective adjudication and the protection of legal rights); Leo 
Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration Experience, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 239, 249–50 (1987) (discussing tensions between the public and private interests in an 
arbitration proceeding). 
 20 See Kanowitz, supra note 19, at 296 (discussing the attributes of arbitration); Sternlight, supra 
note 3, at 56 (stating that many commentators believe arbitration is efficient and generally accepted). 
 21 See Barnes, supra note 2, at 329 (stating that arbitration prevents people from getting their day 
in court); Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the 
Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 20–21 (2003) (explaining that the lack of a jury trial in arbitration is 
worrisome). 
 22 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339 (explaining that there is generally a liberal policy favoring 
arbitration, but such clauses will be rendered unenforceable upon grounds of law or equity). 
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questions of an arbitration agreement’s scope, whereas arbitrators are tasked 
with deciding all else, including questions of procedure.23  
Whether a court or arbitrator decides a matter can have a range of impli-
cations for a claim’s outcome: courts are governed by legal doctrine whereas 
arbitrators have the flexibility to craft equitable solutions not based on judicial 
precedent.24 This distinction means that parties may be deeply invested in 
whether a matter is categorized as a gateway question, known as a question of 
arbitrability, or a question of procedure.25 
Because a growing number of companies include arbitration clauses in 
their contracts, deciding what is a question of arbitrability, and thus within the 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83–84 (2002) (highlighting the dis-
tinctions between questions of arbitrability and procedure); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 
U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (holding that the question of arbitrability depends on whether the parties agreed 
to submit questions to arbitration). Questions of arbitrability are fundamental gateway questions con-
cerning whether parties have agreed to arbitrate an issue’s merits. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83–84. Specif-
ically, questions of arbitrability include questions of the arbitration agreement’s scope, whether the 
arbitration agreement violates law or equity, or where a party asserts a federal statutory claim and 
Congress has demonstrated a clear intent that the statutory claim not be arbitrated. Id. at 84; see P. 
CHRISTINE DERUELLE & COREY BERMAN, WEIL, THE FUTURE OF CLASS ACTION ARBITRATION 2 
(July 23, 2013), http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/Weil_Summer_2013_Class_Action_
Monitor.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8AW-QMAB] (discussing the question of arbitrability). Procedural 
questions are ones that “grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition.” Howsam, 537 U.S. 
at 84 (quoting John Wiley & Sons Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964)). Specifically, this can 
include allegations of waivers and delays. See id. (defining procedural questions in arbitration agree-
ments). 
 24 See Keebler Co. v. Truck Drivers, Local 170, 247 F.3d 8, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2001) (upholding an 
arbitration decision where the arbiter imposed an unconventional, flexible solution); Edward Brunet, 
Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 85 (1990) (stating that “arbitrators, unlike 
judges, are not bound to use substantive law”); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individ-
uation Critique, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 69, 95–96 (2007) (finding that arbiters have more flexibility than 
judges when coming to a solution); Where Flexibility Meets Cost Efficiency in Settling Disputes, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 24, 2013), available at http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/
KSPublic/library/publication/2013articles/4-24-13SCMP_Berger.pdf [https://perma.cc/L75T-CLCC]. 
Specifically, a court’s principal concern must be statutory and case law, whereas arbitrators are not 
governed by legal precedent. Brunet, supra, at 85; Where Flexibility Meets Cost Efficiency in Settling 
Disputes, supra. Thus, arbitrators may take into account fairness or equity if they believe it provides 
the best commercial solution, even if it is contrary to court precedent. See Keebler Co., 247 F.3d at 
11–12 (explaining that it was in the arbiter’s power to use a higher standard of proof than that used by 
the court); Brunet, supra, at 85 (stating that arbiters can craft solutions as they see fit). Consequently, 
whether a court or arbitrator has the power to decide a matter could affect the final outcome of the 
case. See Keebler Co., 247 F.3d at 11–12 (expressing skepticism at the standard of proof used by the 
arbitration panel, but nonetheless upholding its decision); Lewis Maltby, Private Justice: Employment 
Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 49 (1998) (finding that employees 
were generally more victorious in arbitration than in court). For example, one study found that in a 
similar time period, employee-plaintiffs were 63% victorious in arbitrations, but only victorious 
14.9% of the time in federal district courts. Maltby, supra, at 49. 
 25 See Maltby, supra note 24, at 49 (finding that whether a matter is decided before a court or an 
arbitration panel may be outcome determinative); Where Flexibility Meets Cost Efficiency in Settling 
Disputes, supra note 24 (discussing the different factors courts and arbitrators weigh when deciding a 
matter). 
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court’s realm, is becoming increasingly complicated.26 Recently, the availabil-
ity of class arbitration is one such area where the question of arbitrability has 
been contested, affecting employees, consumers, and others who are parties to 
arbitration agreements.27 
B. Class Action Implications 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) allow a plaintiff to file a 
lawsuit on behalf of a larger class if all individuals suffered the same wrong at 
the hands of the defendant.28 This type of lawsuit, known as a class action suit, 
not only saves the court from hearing possibly hundreds or thousands of the 
same or substantially similar claims, but also provides plaintiffs and lawyers an 
incentive to wage a legal battle where there is widespread harm.29 Thus, the 
procedure serves as an equalizer in the litigation system, as individuals who 
would otherwise be powerless against larger opponents have an opportunity to 
vindicate their rights.30 
Although benefits to class action plaintiffs are debated, class action serves 
an important check on companies’ practices and can serve as an impetus for 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See Chesapeake III, 809 F.3d at 753 (highlighting the question of arbitrability debate); 
Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc. (Opalinski III), 761 F.3d 329, 331 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 1530 (2015) (discussing the court’s struggles in deciding whether class action availability is a 
question of arbitrability); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 2013) (stating 
that the court must decide whether class arbitration is a question of arbitrability or procedure); see also 
Ashby Jones, Has Arbitration Become More Burdensome Than Litigation?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 
2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/09/01/has-arbitration-become-worse-than-litigation/ [https://
perma.cc/N9EZ-W23D] (discussing the increasing complexities in arbitration, a system that is meant 
to promote procedural and economic efficiency). 
 27 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003) (plurality opinion) (highlighting 
that a contract’s silence on class action availability poses a problem for the courts); Chesapeake III, 
809 F.3d at 753 (demonstrating the differing opinions of class action arbitration); Opalinski III, 761 
F.3d at 331–32 (exemplifying the class action arbitration debate). See generally Deruelle & Berman, 
supra note 23 (providing an overview of class action availability in arbitration agreements). 
 28 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Barnes, supra note 2, at 331–33 (explaining the historical context of 
Rule 23 and its importance in vindicating individuals’ rights). 
 29 See Amchen Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit 
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)) (explaining the importance of class action in small recovery 
claims); Barnes, supra note 2, at 333 (stating that there is little incentive to litigate small claims with-
out arbitration). This is especially true for small recovery claims. See Amchen, 521 U.S. at 617. When 
the recovery is small and the litigation costly, there is little incentive for a plaintiff to initiate litiga-
tion, or for an attorney to take the case. Id. Class action, however, aggregates the small recoveries into 
a much larger recovery. Id. But see Lambert, supra note 9 (discussing negative views of class action, 
such as it being a method that facilitates lawyers bringing frivolous lawsuits and being rewarded with 
a big settlement fee). 
 30 See Amchen, 521 U.S. at 617 (finding that class action is important when fighting against small 
claims); Barnes, supra note 2, at 333 (stating that individuals often do not have the resources to fight 
claims alone). 
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policy change in the workplace.31 First, class action is a restraint on companies 
because it serves as deterrence against illegal activity.32 When companies be-
lieve that they can be exposed to class action lawsuits, there is evidence that 
they invest in compliance to assure that they are monitoring potentially unlaw-
ful activities.33 Consequently, immunity from class action suits diminishes this 
emphasis on compliance, which can lead to unlawful activities and harm 
against consumers.34 Further, class action is an important way in which sys-
temic and discriminatory issues are addressed.35 After a successful class action 
suit, a company may be forced to change a policy or may make policy changes 
on its own to assuage negative attention.36 Thus, class action serves a number 
of interests and has been an important avenue of redress for individuals pitted 
against more formidable opponents.37 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830, 32,862–63 (May 24, 2016) (to be codified at 
12 C.F.R. pt. 1040) (finding that class action is an incentive to comply with the law); Mark Bolin, 
Comment, Fear and Loathing of Class Action Arbitration, or How to Dismiss the Effective Vindica-
tion Doctrine, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 563, 576 (2014) (explaining that class action lawsuits are an 
important private cause of action that serve as a deterrent against anticompetitive conduct); Fresh Air: 
Have We Lost a Constitutional Right in the Fine Print?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 12, 2015), http://
www.npr.org/2015/11/12/455749456/have-we-lost-a-constitutional-right-in-the-fine-print [https://
perma.cc/S884-P7BE] [hereinafter Fresh Air] (statement of Jessica Silver-Greenberg) (explaining that 
class action is a powerful way in which workplace discrimination issues are addressed). 
 32 See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,862–63 (stating companies are more likely to 
comply with the law when there is the potential for a class action lawsuit); Barnes, supra note 2, at 
333 (highlighting the important interest class action serves regarding deterrence); Bolin, supra note 
31, at 576 (discussing how class action promotes deterrence). 
 33 See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,862 (finding that companies monitor class 
litigation so that they can limit their liability). The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) 
highlighted there has been a renewed stress on consumer law compliance since the CFPB released the 
outline of the Proposed Rules. Id. at 32,862–63. Thus, this exemplifies how potential exposure to class 
action results in companies taking steps to ensure they are acting in the bounds of the law. See id. 
(noting that companies take affirmative steps to limit liability when class litigation is a threat). 
 34 See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,862–63 (stating that companies have less of an 
incentive to comply with the law absent class action); Barnes, supra note 2, at 333 (highlighting that 
class actions deter wrongful activity); Bolin, supra note 31, at 576 (discussing the deterrent value of 
class action lawsuits). 
 35 See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 8, 29–31 (highlighting that class action has been important in 
serving public policy interests); Fresh Air, supra note 31 (finding that class action is important in 
addressing systemic issues). 
 36 See Consent Decree, Gonzalez v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Nos. 03-2817 SI, 04-4730, and 
04-4731 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (ordering Abercrombie & Fitch to end racial and gender discrimination in 
its stores after a successful class action lawsuit); Joanne Doroshow, Fact Sheet: Class Actions Are 
Critical to Remedy Workplace Racial Discrimination, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST.: FIGHTING FOR JUST. 
BLOG (Oct. 24, 2014), https://www.justice.org/blog/fact-sheet-class-actions-are-critical-remedy-
workplace-racial-discrimination [https://perma.cc/AS49-X227] (highlighting class action’s importance 
in systemic discrimination cases); Fresh Air, supra note 31 (explaining that class action is a vital tool 
for dealing with systemic issues such as wage theft).  
 37 See Barnes, supra note 2, at 333 (discussing the important policy implications of a class action 
lawsuit); Bolin, supra note 31, at 576 (finding class action lawsuits an important private cause of 
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C. Class Action and the Question of Arbitrability 
 Although a party has the opportunity to bring forth a class action case when 
litigating, the same cannot be said for an arbitration proceeding, where the 
rules are derived from the contract between the parties rather than the FRCP.38 
Thus, class action may not be an available course of action if it is not included 
in the contract’s arbitration clause.39 Whether an arbitration clause includes the 
availability of class action is often ambiguous and thus becomes a question 
that must be answered by a neutral decisionmaker.40 Whether this neutral deci-
sionmaker should be a court or an arbitrator, however, is unclear, and impli-
cates the question of arbitrability analysis.41 If the availability of class action is 
a question of arbitrability it is within the court’s realm; however, if it is a ques-
tion of procedure it is for the arbitrator to decide.42 
Until recently, the availability of class arbitration was implicitly a ques-
tion of arbitrability.43 That is, courts answered the question of class availability 
without initially addressing whether it was in their jurisdiction to decide.44 
                                                                                                                           
action); Fresh Air, supra note 31 (explaining class action’s importance in cases concerning systemic 
discrimination). 
 38 See Opalinski III, 761 F.3d at 335 (quoting Puleo v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 178 
(3d Cir. 2010)) (stating that arbitration is a creature of contract and thus the rules must be delineated 
in the text). Attempts to argue that Rule 81(b)(6) allows parties to incorporate Rule 23 have been 
unsuccessful. See Deiulemar Compagnia di Navigazione S.p.A v. M/V Allegra, 198 F.3d 473, 482–83 
(4th Cir. 1999) (holding that Rule 81(a)(3), now amended as Rule 81(b)(6), cannot be used to imple-
ment Rule 23 for class action arbitration); Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 275–77 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (holding that Rule 81(b)(6) is not sufficient to incorporate Rule 23 concerning class action 
arbitration). See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23, 81 (allowing parties to fill in procedural gaps left open 
by the FAA). Rule 81(a)(3) allows the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to apply in arbitration pro-
ceedings if the procedural matter is not provided in the statute. See id. at 81(b)(6). The courts, howev-
er, have held that the FAA does not leave a procedural gap for class action. Allegra, 198 F.3d at 482–
83; Champ, 55 F.3d at 275–77. 
 39 See Stolt-Nielson, 559 U.S. at 687 (holding that companies cannot be compelled into class 
action arbitration when the agreement is silent on the issue). 
 40 See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452 (plurality opinion) (exemplifying that the two parties had different 
opinions on class action arbitration and thus that the question needed to be decided by a neutral party); 
Opalinski III, 761 F.3d at 331–32 (demonstrating the starkly different opinions on the availability of 
class action, and thus the need for a neutral party to decide the question). 
 41 Opalinski III, 761 F.3d at 331–32; see Martin Saunders, Class Arbitration—Who Decides?, 
NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/class-arbitration-who-decides 
[https://perma.cc/DKK8-QJ8Z] (discussing the dispute of “who decides” in class action availability). 
 42 See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452 (plurality opinion) (exemplifying that when the court finds the 
question one of procedure, it is for the arbitrator to decide); Saunders, supra note 41 (discussing the 
“who decides” question). 
 43 See, e.g., Champ, 55 F.3d at 271 (deciding the question of class arbitration, and therefore as-
suming the matter as a question of arbitrability); Deruelle & Berman, supra note 23, at 2 (stating that 
the availability of class action used to be a question of arbitrability). The courts did not explicitly 
discuss the question of arbitrability in class action availability cases. Champ, 55 F.3d at 27. Instead, 
by addressing the substantive issue, it was implicit that it was a gateway question for the courts. See 
id. (demonstrating the court deciding class action availability). 
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When tasked with the issue, almost all federal circuits adopted a broad in-
terpretation of the FAA and held that a party was precluded from consolidating 
claims if the arbitration clause was silent on the issue.45 Courts reasoned that 
the FAA’s policy of arbitral efficiency required a literal construction of arbitra-
tion clauses.46 Therefore, if class action or consolidating claims was not explic-
itly mentioned, there was no basis to find it was available.47 This broad inter-
pretation of the FAA resulted in the statute preempting a wide array of state 
law.48 
In 2003, however, in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, a plurality of 
the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the availability of class action was 
actually a question of procedure and thus within the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.49 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See, e.g., Champ, 55 F.3d at 275 (addressing class arbitration without first discussing the “who 
decides” analysis); Deruelle & Berman, supra note 23, at 2 (stating that the class action availability 
used to be a question of arbitrability). 
 45 Compare Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 265 F.3d 1059, 1060 (5th Cir. 2001) (af-
firming a lower court’s decision that a class action waiver was enforceable), and Dominium Austin 
Partners, LLC v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 728–29 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that an arbitration clause 
does not permit class action because there was no explicit provision for arbitration as a class), and 
Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding a class action waiver en-
forceable because there was no statutory language or legislative history evidencing that Congress 
intended for claims not to be arbitrated), and Allegra, 198 F.3d at 483 (holding that class action was 
unavailable because the FAA did not leave any procedural gaps, thus precluding the usage of Rule 
81(b)(6)), and Glencore, Ltd. v. Schnitzer Steel Prods. Co., 189 F.3d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding 
that a joining hearing was not permissible where nothing in the terms of the arbitration agreements 
provided for a joint hearing), and Champ, 55 F.3d at 275 (holding that class action was not available 
because the arbitration agreement was silent on the matter), and Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Cas. 
Co., 951 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that consolidating proceedings is invalid because the 
arbitration agreement was silent on consolidation), and Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Nat’l Life 
Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that the court was without power to consoli-
date proceedings because the arbitration agreement did not mention consolidation), and Weyerhaeuser 
Co. v. W. Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding parties could not consolidate 
claims because the arbitration agreement was silent on the matter), with New England Energy Inc., v. 
Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that the court could consolidate claims 
despite the arbitration agreement’s silence regarding consolidation). See generally Deruelle & Ber-
man, supra note 23 (providing a summary of federal decisions concerning the availability of class 
action arbitration). 
 46 See, e.g., Champ, 55 F.3d at 275 (“The FAA forbids federal judges from ordering class arbitra-
tion where the parties’ arbitration agreement is silent on the matter.”); Deruelle & Berman, supra note 
23, at 2 (stating that federal courts’ reasoned that they lack authority to read into silence in arbitration 
agreements). 
 47 Champ, 55 F.3d at 275. 
 48 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352 (preempting a common law test adopted by California that 
invalidated class action waivers in certain contracts); Cole, supra note 5, at 272–73 (stating that the 
Supreme Court’s FAA doctrine preempts state regulation or judicial decisions). Most notably, in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court invalidated California’s common law “Dis-
cover Bank” test. 563 U.S. at 352; Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1116 (Cal. 2009). 
The invalidation of the Discover Bank test sent shockwaves through the consumer protection commu-
nity. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 5, at 272–73. 
 49 Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452–53 (plurality opinion). 
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The plurality explained that this issue concerned the “kind of arbitration pro-
ceeding” rather than a gateway question concerning the agreement’s scope.50 
Yet decisions post-Bazzle cast doubt on this opinion, and the Court explicitly 
stated in subsequent cases that the Bazzle plurality was not binding.51 Thus, 
there is currently a consensus that the Court has not directly decided whether 
the availability of class action is a question of arbitrability or procedure.52 
II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT AND THE QUESTION OF ARBITRABILITY 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not reached a conclusion, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently issued two opinions addressing 
the topic.53 In 2014, in Opalinski v. Robert Half International Inc. (“Opalinski 
III”), the Third Circuit held that class arbitration was a question of arbitrability 
unless there is a clear and unmistakable delegation to the arbitrators.54 Subse-
quently, in 2016, the Third Circuit cemented and clarified the “clear and un-
mistakable” standard in Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC 
(“Chesapeake III”).55 Part A of this Section discusses the Opalinski III decision 
and the Chesapeake III case history.56 Part B discusses the Chesapeake III de-
cision in the Third Circuit.57  
A. The Third Circuit Decides Class Action Is a “Question of Arbitrability,” 
but Leaves Lines Hazy 
 In Opalinski III, the Third Circuit confronted the question of who decides 
the availability of class arbitration.58 In April of 2010, employees of Robert 
House International filed a class action lawsuit, claiming their employer had 
failed to pay them overtime pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.59 The 
employment contract, however, contained an arbitration clause and therefore 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Id. at 452. 
 51 See Stolt-Neilson, 559 U.S. at 680 (stating that only a plurality decided Green Tree Financial 
Corp. v. Bazzle and thus class action availability is still an undecided question); see also Oxford 
Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 n.2 (2013) (stating that Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. Ani-
malFeeds Int’l Corp. made it clear that class arbitration as a question of arbitrability is still undecid-
ed). 
 52 Stolt-Neilson, 559 U.S. at 680; Opalinski III, 761 F.3d at 331. 
 53 Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC (Chesapeake III), 809 F.3d 746, 753 
(3d Cir. 2016); Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc. (Opalinski III), 761 F.3d 329, 330 (3d Cir. 2014), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1530 (2015). 
 54 Opalinski III, 761 F.3d at 335. 
 55 Chesapeake III, 809 F.3d at 766.  
56 See infra notes 58–80 and accompanying text. 
57 See infra notes 81–95 and accompanying text. 
58 Opalinski III, 761 F.3d at 335. 
 59 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2012); See Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc. (Opalinski I), No. 10-CV-2069, 
2011 WL 4729009, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2011). 
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the parties were compelled to arbitrate.60 The arbitration clause was silent re-
garding class action, and thus as a preliminary matter, the arbitrators decided 
that employees could proceed through class action.61 The employer immediate-
ly sought to vacate the arbitrator’s decision, claiming that it was not within the 
panel’s authority to decide the availability of class arbitration.62 Thus, the 
Third Circuit was faced with a question similar to that in Green Tree Financial 
Corp. v. Bazzle—was the availability of class action a question of arbitrability 
and thus within the court’s realm to decide?63 The Third Circuit ultimately held 
that the availability of class action was a question of arbitrability unless the 
contract clearly and unmistakably provided otherwise.64 The Third Circuit ex-
plained that bilateral arbitration and class action are distinct proceedings; bilat-
eral arbitration has a presumption of privacy and confidentiality, but class ac-
tion adjudicates far more and the stakes are much higher.65 Thus, class action 
changes the type of controversy submitted to arbitration and the parties in-
volved, making it a gateway question.66 Opalinski III therefore clarified the 
“who decides” question for the Third Circuit, but it still remained unclear what 
exactly would constitute a “clear and unmistakable” delegation to the arbitra-
tor.67 The court confronted this issue in Chesapeake III.68 
In Chesapeake III, the Third Circuit was tasked with interpreting an arbi-
tration clause between lessor, Scout Petroleum, and lessee, Chesapeake Appa-
lachia.69 In 2008, Chesapeake entered into oil and gas leases with several 
Pennsylvania landowners, and Scout Petroleum later bought the rights to a 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Opalinski I, 2011 WL 4729009, at *2, *8. 
 61 See Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc. (Opalinski II), No. 10-CV-2069, 2012 WL 6026674, at 
*1 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2012). 
 62 Opalinski II, 2012 WL 6026674, at *1. The District Court found that it could not overturn the 
arbitrator’s decision, as it had little authority to interrupt arbiter awards. Id. The employer then ap-
pealed the District Court’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Opalinski III, 
761 F.3d at 329. 
 63 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453 (2003) (plurality opinion); Opalinski 
III, 761 F.3d at 331–32. 
 64 Opalinski III, 761 F.3d at 335. In other words, a clear and unmistakable delegation to the arbi-
trators allows the arbitrators to decide questions of arbitrability. Id. 
 65 See id. at 333–34. (reasoning that the distinctions between class and bilateral arbitration lead to 
the conclusion that class arbitration is a question for the courts). 
 66 Id. Specifically, it was a gateway question because it was a matter of the clause’s scope. Id. 
The Opalinski III court relied on recent dicta from the Supreme Court stating that bilateral and class 
arbitration are starkly different types of proceedings. Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 
559 U.S. 662, 686–87 (2010); Opalinski II, 761 F.3d at 333 (citing Stolt-Neilson, 559 U.S. at 686–87). 
 67 Opalinski III, 761 F.3d at 334–35. 
 68 See Chesapeake III, 809 F.3d at 753; Chesapeake Appalachia LLC v. Scout Petroleum LLC 
(Chesapeake II), 73 F. Supp. 3d 488, 490 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Chesapeake Appalachia LLC v. Scout 
Petroleum LLC (Chesapeake I), No. 4:14-CV-0620, 2014 WL 5370683, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 
2014). 
 69 Chesapeake III, 809 F.3d at 748. 
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number of the leases.70 The leases included an arbitration clause providing that 
all disputes would be determined pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitra-
tion Association (“AAA”).71 In March of 2014, Scout filed a class action arbi-
tration demand with the AAA, claiming that Chesapeake was paying insuffi-
cient royalties to Scout and similarly situated lessors.72 Chesapeake immedi-
ately objected to class arbitration and demanded declaratory and summary 
judgment in the district court.73 Chesapeake argued that the availability of 
class action was a question of arbitrability and thus within the court’s jurisdic-
tion.74 Before the court responded, the panel of arbitrators released a decision 
concerning class arbitration and the question of arbitrability.75 Although the 
arbitrators acknowledged the Opalinski III decision, they stated that the con-
tract between Chesapeake and Scout did clearly and unmistakably authorize 
the arbitrators to make a decision on class arbitrability.76 The arbitrators ex-
plained that the AAA’s Supplementary Rules explicitly designated arbitrators 
to decide class availability, thus meeting the Opalinski III standard.77 
In October 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Penn-
sylvania confronted the issue, vacating the arbitrators’ decision and granting 
Chesapeake’s motion for summary judgment.78 Further, the court denied a mo-
tion for reconsideration, and explained that the contract was silent and ambig-
                                                                                                                           
 70 Chesapeake II, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 491–92. 
 71 Id. at 492. The clause, relevant in part, explains: 
ARBITRATION: In the event of a disagreement between Lessor and Lessee concerning 
this Lease, performance thereunder, or damages caused by Lessee’s operations, the res-
olution of all such disputes shall be determined by arbitration in accordance with the 
rules of the American Arbitration Association. All fees and costs associated with arbi-
tration shall be borne equally by the Lessor and Lessee. 
Id. 
 72 Demand for Arbitration at 6, Scout Petroleum, LLC v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 14-
115-339-14 (Mar. 17, 2014). 
 73 Chesapeake II, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 490. 
 74 See id. 
 75 See Scout Petroleum, LLC v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC (Chesapeake Arbitration), No. 14-
115-339-14, at 6 (Oct. 6, 2014) (Bechtle, Kauffman, Gertner, Arbs.). But see Chesapeake I, 2014 WL 
5370683, at *1 (stating that the arbitrators also decided that class arbitration was available per the 
contract). 
 76 Chesapeake Arbitration, No. 14-115-339-14, at 6. 
 77 See id. at 6–8; see also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBI-
TRATIONS ¶ 3, https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004129 [https://perma.cc/B4BA-
SRAG] (providing that “the arbitrator shall determine as a threshold matter, in a reasoned, partial final 
award on the construction of the arbitration clause, whether the applicable arbitration clause permits 
the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a class”). 
 78 Chesapeake I, 2014 WL 5370683, at *2. 
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uous as to who decides class arbitration, and thus did not meet the onerous 
“clear and unmistakable” burden.79 Scout appealed to the Third Circuit.80 
B. The Third Circuit Returns to the “Who Decides” Question, and Imposes 
Burden on Consumers and Employees 
In Chesapeake III, the Third Circuit was tasked with deciding whether an 
incorporation of the AAA’s rules—whose Supplementary Rules delegate to 
arbitrators the responsibility of deciding class availability—clearly and unmis-
takably delegated the issue of class availability to the arbitrators.81 Ultimately, 
the court disagreed with Scout’s argument that an incorporation of the AAA 
met this clear and unmistakable burden.82 Instead, the Third Circuit held that 
the language of the leases, the nature and rules of the AAA, and case law led to 
the conclusion that there was no clear and unmistakable delegation to the arbi-
trators.83 
First, in regard to language of the leases, the court stated that the mere in-
clusion of the AAA was not sufficient without a further specific reference to 
class arbitration.84 Although no specific incantation was necessary, the court 
highlighted that a lack of reference to the Supplementary Rules specifically or 
the availability of class action made it extremely difficult for Scout to meet its 
onerous burden.85 Additionally, the court found it important that the leases 
contained singular terms to describe dispute resolution and that this demon-
strated intent to arbitrate bilaterally.86 Second, the court explained that the 
Supplementary Rules, alone, are not enough to trigger class arbitration.87 Us-
                                                                                                                           
 79 Chesapeake II, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 501. Although the District Court found that class action was a 
question of arbitrability, it did not answer the subsequent question—whether the parties could proceed 
to class arbitration. Id. at 502. 
 80 Chesapeake III, 809 F.3d at 752. 
 81 Id. at 748. 
 82 Id. According to the court, Scout argued that 
(1) the Leases expressly state that the arbitration will be conducted in accordance with 
the rules of the American Arbitration Association; (2) under Pennsylvania law, the arbi-
tration clause incorporates all the AAA rules into the Leases, which are part of the par-
ties’ agreement as if fully printed in haec verba therein; and (3) the Commercial and 
Supplementary Rules, as integral parts of the Leases, thereby clearly and unmistakably 
vest the arbitrators with the jurisdiction to decide the question of class arbitrability. 
Id. at 753–54 (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 
77, ¶ 3 (providing that the arbitrator shall determine whether class arbitration is available as a thresh-
old matter). 
 83 Chesapeake III, 809 F.3d at 754. 
 84 Id. at 758. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 759–60. The lease stated that all disputes between a “Lessor” and “Lessee” concerning 
the “Lease” would be resolved in arbitration. Id. at 760. 
 87 Id. at 762–63. 
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ing a “daisy chain” of cross-references, the court explained that an incorpora-
tion of the AAA does not necessarily mean that the parties consented to an in-
corporation of the Supplementary Rules.88 Finally, although the Third Circuit 
acknowledged that there was case law supporting the conclusion that an AAA 
incorporation constitutes a clear and unmistakable delegation of gateway ques-
tions to arbitrators, these cases all concerned bilateral arbitrations.89 The court 
explained that bilateral arbitration case law is not influential in the context of 
class arbitrability due to the stark differences between class and bilateral pro-
ceedings.90  
The Third Circuit also gave weight to a U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit decision that found that incorporating the AAA rules was not a 
clear and unmistakable delegation to the arbitrators.91 In 2012, in Reed Else-
vier, Inc. v. Crockett, the Sixth Circuit explained that without a reference to 
class arbitration, it was within the court’s realm to decide class arbitrability.92 
Influenced by the Crockett decision, the Third Circuit stated they saw no com-
pelling reason to disregard the Sixth Circuit’s decision.93 
Consequently, the arbitration clause at issue in Chesapeake III did not 
“clearly and unmistakably” delegate the availability of class action to arbitra-
                                                                                                                           
 88 Id. The court explained that the “daisy chain of cross references” starts with the lease, and goes 
to the AAA Rules, and to the Commercial Rules. Id. There is no mention of the Supplementary Rules 
in the Commercial Rules and therefore the “daisy chain” of cross-references. Id. 
 89 Id. at 763–64; see also Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 724 F.3d 1069, 1074–75 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (holding that an incorporation of the United Nations’ arbitration rules is a clear and unmis-
takable delegation to the arbitrators, as long as the parties as sophisticated to commercial contracts); 
Fallo v. High-Tech Inst., 559 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that incorporating Rule 7(a) of 
the AAA provides clear and unmistakable delegation to the arbitrators); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia 
Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that a general incorporation of the AAA clearly 
and unmistakable delegates the question of arbitrability to the arbitrators). 
 90 Chesapeake III, 809 F.3d at 764. 
 91 Id. at 765–66; Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2013). The contract 
in question had an arbitration agreement that incorporated the AAA but did not make specific mention 
of the Supplementary Rules. Crockett, 734 F.3d at 599. Analyzing case law, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit first found that class arbitration was a question of arbitrability, unless clearly and 
unmistakably otherwise. Id. at 598–99 (noting that “for recently the Court has given every indication, 
short of an outright holding, that classwide arbitrability is a gateway question rather than a subsidiary 
one”). The court then found that the arbitration clause did not clearly and unmistakably provide oth-
erwise because there was no reference to class arbitration in the contract. Id. at 597, 599. 
 92 Crockett, 734 F.3d at 599–600. Once deciding that it was within their jurisdiction, the court 
used similar reasoning to find that class arbitration was not available. Id. The court explained that 
class arbitration was not mentioned within the contract and thus they could not read into silence. Id. 
The court was influenced by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l 
Corp.; an agreement to arbitrate does not mean that the parties agreed to arbitrate through a class. 
Stolt-Nielson, 559 U.S. at 685; Crockett, 734 F.3d at 600. 
 93 Chesapeake III, 809 F.3d at 766. Thus, the Court saw no strong compulsion to create a circuit 
split, especially after they had joined the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in holding that 
class arbitration was a question of arbitrability. Id. 
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tors.94 Thus, the question would be subjected to the courts and their precedent, 
where the same silence used to conclude there was no delegation to arbitrators 
would likely be constructed to find class action unavailable.95 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHESAPEAKE III: UNEVEN BARGAINING  
POWER IMPEDES CONSUMERS’ AND EMPLOYEES’  
ABILITIES TO BRING CLASS CLAIMS 
The Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC (“Chesapeake 
III”) decision not only reaffirmed that class action arbitration availability is a 
question of arbitrability, but also narrowed what language can “clearly and 
unmistakably” delegate power to the arbitrators.96 Post-Chesapeake III, an in-
corporation of the AAA rules is not enough to meet this standard in the Third 
Circuit.97 Rather, it appears that there must be specific language or specific 
reference within the arbitration clause suggesting it is within the arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction to decide class action.98 Although Chesapeake III incentivizes con-
tract clarity, it further hinders parties’ abilities to bring class arbitration claims, 
because large companies who are often responsible for drafting contracts can 
choose not to include language invoking class availability, and thereby decline 
class action opportunities.99 
As previously discussed, whether a court or an arbitrator has jurisdiction 
over a matter can affect a case considerably.100 Chesapeake III demonstrated 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Id. 
 95 See Chesapeake II, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 492 (demonstrating that the arbitration clause was silent 
as to class arbitration); supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the precedent that an arbitra-
tion clause’s silence on consolidating claims renders the process unavailable). 
 96 Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC (Chesapeake III), 809 F.3d 746, 751 
(3d Cir. 2016) (finding that an incorporation of the AAA rules is not a clear and unmistakable delega-
tion to the arbiters). 
 97 Id. at 762. 
 98 Id. at 759. 
 99 See id. at 758–59 (incentivizing contract clarity by stating a party’s onerous burden will not be 
met without some sort of reference to arbitrators); Barnes, supra note 2, at 336 (demonstrating that 
consumers and employees have little to no bargaining power vis-à-vis the corporation); Katherine Van 
Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of 
the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1037 (1996) (arguing that employees are rarely in a position to 
negotiate the terms of an arbitration agreement and rather are presented with a “take it or leave it” 
situation). 
 100 See Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc. (Opalinski II), No. 10-CV-2069, 2012 WL 6026674, at 
*1 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2012) (demonstrating a situation where the arbitrators decided that class action was 
available in an arbitration clause silent on the matter); Maltby, supra note 24, at 49 (underscoring the 
potential difference of outcomes that result from a case going to a court or an arbitration panel); 
Where Flexibility Meets Cost Efficiency in Settling Disputes, supra note 24 (highlighting the different 
factors that arbitrators and courts weigh when coming to a decision). As previously stated, courts are 
bound by case law and legal doctrine, whereas arbitrators are able to craft solutions based on their 
perception of an equitable commercial outcome. Where Flexibility Meets Cost Efficiency in Settling 
Disputes, supra note 24. Thus, a court and arbitrator may come to different solutions based on the 
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that the distinction between arbitration and litigation is especially stark in the 
context of the availability of class arbitration.101 There is abundant case law 
finding that class action will not be available when an arbitration clause is si-
lent on the matter.102 Thus, courts are heavily constrained when considering the 
availability of class arbitration.103 In contrast, arbitrators are not bound by 
stringent circuit precedent and could find that class action is available if it pre-
sents an equitable and fair solution, as did the arbitrators in the Opalinski cas-
es.104 Therefore, there is potential that the courts and arbitrators would inter-
pret the availability of class action quite differently, with large consequences 
for both company and consumer.105 
The potential difference in interpretation means that parties in an arbitra-
tion agreement will likely prefer a different and neutral decisionmaker.106 
Companies, who are generally averse to class action, do not want to leave the 
matter of class action availability to the uncertainty of an arbitration panel, but 
rather to the stability and favorable precedent of the judicial branch.107 On the 
                                                                                                                           
same set of facts. See Maltby, supra note 24, at 49 (finding that arbiters and courts often come to 
different decisions on similar cases). 
 101 See Chesapeake III, 809 F.3d at 751 (demonstrating that the parties involved had different 
opinions as to who should decide class arbitration). 
 102 See, e.g., Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that an 
arbitration clause’s silence on class action rendered the procedure unavailable); supra note 45 and 
accompanying text (discussing federal precedent that class action will not be available to parties in an 
arbitration agreement where the arbitration clause is silent on the matter). 
 103 See Brunet, supra note 24, at 85 (explaining that courts, unlike arbitrators, must follow sub-
stantive law); Where Flexibility Meets Cost Efficiency in Settling Disputes, supra note 24 (explaining 
that courts are often bound by precedent); supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing federal 
precedent that class action will not be available to parties in an arbitration agreement where the arbi-
tration clause is silent on the matter). 
 104 See Opalinski II, 2012 WL 6026674, at *1 (stating that the arbitrators found class arbitration 
available despite the arbitration clauses’ silence on the matter); Brunet, supra note 24, at 85 (stating 
that arbitrators are not bound to substantive law); Weidemaier, supra note 24, at 95–97 (stating that 
arbitrators have more flexibility to make decision); Where Flexibility Meets Cost Efficiency in Settling 
Disputes, supra note 24 (explaining the differences between the arbitration and litigation forums). 
Chesapeake III was an intimation of this scenario. 809 F.3d at 751. Although the court gave great 
weight to Opalinski II and Supreme Court dicta when finding that it was within their realm to decide 
class arbitrability, the arbitration panel interpreted precedent differently. Id. 
 105 See Chesapeake III, 809 F.3d at 751 (explaining that the arbitrators believed it was within 
their jurisdiction to decide the availability of class action, whereas the courts found that this was an 
incorrect interpretation of precedent); Opalinski II, 2012 WL 6026674, at *1; Weidemaier, supra note 
24, at 95–97 (explaining how arbitrators adopt a more flexible approach than the courts).  
 106 See Chesapeake III, 809 F.3d at 751 (demonstrating that the parties preferred different neutral 
decisionmakers); Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc. (Opalinski III), 761 F.3d 329, 329 (3d Cir. 2014), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1530 (2015) (demonstrating that the employees wanted arbitrators to decide 
class arbitrability, whereas the employer wanted the court to decide class arbitrability). 
 107 See Chesapeake III, 809 F.3d at 751 (demonstrating how Chesapeake filed a declaratory 
judgment, which sought a judgment declaring that the court decide the class arbitration availability); 
Opalinski III, 761 F.3d at 329 (stating that the company, Roberts Half International, argued that courts 
must decide class action availability, not arbitrators). 
2017] Third Circuit Decides Class Arbitration Availability, Burdens Consumers 179 
same note, consumers and employees would rather have an arbitrator decide 
the availability of class action because there is a possibility that the arbitrator 
would find it an equitable solution.108 
Given that companies hold nearly all of the bargaining power in drafting 
consumer and employee contracts, they are in a dominating position to control 
class action availability by refusing to include language that would delegate 
authority over class availability to arbitrators.109 Many modern employment 
and consumer contracts with arbitration clauses are mandatory, meaning they 
are entirely drafted by companies and then presented to consumers and em-
ployees as “take it or leave it.”110 In an age where these contracts are signed to 
rent a car, watch online television, or setup a cellular telephone plan, most 
have little choice but to accept.111 Further, the lengthy legal jargon of contracts 
leaves most with little understanding of an agreement’s terms or any rights that 
they have given up.112 In fact, in the consumer realm, most people do not even 
realize that they have entered into arbitration agreements and therefore have no 
understanding of their contracts.113 Thus, the extremely uneven bargaining 
                                                                                                                           
 108 See Opalinski III, 761 F.3d at 334 (demonstrating a situation where the arbitrators decided 
class action was available and the Third Circuit ultimately reversed the panel’s decision); Reed Else-
vier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 599–600 (6th Cir. 2013) (exemplifying that the consumer be-
lieved class action should be considered a question of procedure and thus for the arbitrators to decide). 
This is not to say that arbitrators are pro-class action. See generally Lisa B. Bingham, Employment 
Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997) (highlighting the 
advantages corporations have over consumers and employees when a matter proceeds to arbitration). 
In the case of class action availability, however, arbitrators seem to present better opportunities for 
consumers than the courts. See Crockett, 734 F.3d at 599–600 (demonstrating that once the court 
found class action was a question of arbitrability and thus within their jurisdiction, they almost simul-
taneously decided class action would not be available). 
 109 See Barnes, supra note 2, at 336 (highlighting that consumers and employees have a dearth of 
bargaining power in arbitration agreements with companies); Nicole F. Munro & Peter L. Cockrell, 
Drafting Arbitration Agreements: A Practitioner’s Guide for Consumer Credit Contracts, 8 J. BUS. & 
TECH. L. 363, 376–77 (2013) (explaining the mechanism for drafting a strong arbitration clause pre-
cluding class action that can also withhold challenges in court); Van Wezel Stone, supra note 99, at 
1037 (arguing that employees are rarely in a position to negotiate the terms of an arbitration agree-
ment and rather are presented with a “take it or leave it” situation). 
 110 Barnes, supra note 2, at 336; Van Wezel Stone, supra note 99, at 1037. 
 111 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 1, § 2.3, at 7 (detailing how pervasive arbitra-
tion clauses are in consumer contracts); Barnes, supra note 2, at 336 (stating that many arbitration 
agreements are contracts of adhesion). For example, one study found that 99.9% of the cellphone 
market use arbitration clauses in their contract. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 1, § 2.3, 
at 7. 
 112 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 1, § 3.4.3, at 21 (finding that many consum-
ers do not understand the substance of their credit card contracts). The CFPB study found that 78.8% 
of consumers in credit card agreements did not know whether they could sue their credit card issuer in 
court. Id. Further, the study found that over half of the respondents subject to arbitration clauses false-
ly believed they could bring class action claim. Id. at 24. 
 113 See id. § 3.2, at 8 (citing a study where 87% of respondents said they had never entered a con-
sumer contract with an arbitration clause, when in reality they had entered into at least one consumer 
contract with an arbitration clause). 
180 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:E. Supp. 
power between companies and the average citizen allows companies to control 
terms, including class action availability.114 
That companies are both drafting the contracts and averse to class action 
makes it highly unlikely they would include the necessary language to “clearly 
and unmistakably” delegate arbitrators the power to decide class action availa-
bility.115 Thus, the Chesapeake III holding further insulates companies from 
class action because of companies’ control over contractual terms.116 Without 
bargaining power to alter the conditions of the contract, average consumers 
and employees are left with scarce options when fighting for the ability to pur-
sue a class arbitration claim.117 
As a result of class arbitration restrictions, many consumers and employ-
ees have been unable or unwilling to bring forth claims against companies, as 
bilateral arbitration can be expensive and impractical.118 This is exacerbated by 
the fact many lawyers are unwilling to provide their services because the 
claims, and thus potential rewards, are quite small on a bilateral level.119 Alt-
hough some claim that the restrictions are necessary to adhere to the FAA poli-
cies, class action advocates argue that the average citizen is losing his day in 
court.120 Either way, it is clear that companies have saved millions, if not bil-
lions, of dollars by restricting such claims.121 In sum, by cementing Opalinski 
v. Robert Half International Inc. (“Opalinski III”) and narrowing the meaning 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See id. (demonstrating the uneven bargaining power by stating that many consumers do not 
realize they have entered arbitration agreements); Barnes, supra note 2, at 336 (stating that pre-dispute 
clauses are contracts of adhesion); Van Wezel Stone, supra note 99, at 1037 (explaining that many 
employee contracts are presented as “take it or leave it”). 
 115 See Barnes, supra note 2, at 336 (highlighting the uneven bargaining power in arbitration 
agreements); Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 1 (demonstrating that many consumers and 
employees are finding themselves unable to redress claims against companies because they are pre-
cluded from class arbitration). 
 116 See Chesapeake III, 809 F.3d at 758 (stating that without a specific incantation or reference to 
class arbitration, it will be quite difficult to meet the “clear and unmistakable” burden). 
 117 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 1, § 1.4.1, at 11 (finding that only 616 cases 
were filed with the AAA between 2010–2012); Barnes, supra note 2, at 336 (claiming that consumers 
and employees have very little bargaining power vis-à-vis ); Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 
1 (detailing the struggles many consumers face when attempting to arbitrate bilaterally). 
 118 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 1, § 1.4.1, at 11; Barnes, supra note 2, at 336; 
Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 1. For example, in five years, Verizon faced 65 consumer 
arbitrations out of its 125 million subscribers. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 1. 
 119 See Amchen Prods, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (explaining that lawyers are 
less likely to take cases when the rewards are smaller and therefore class action is an important tool in 
garnering legal support); Barnes, supra note 2, at 333 (highlighting that in certain cases, the cost of 
proving damages is much more expensive than any recovery, and thus no client or lawyer would take 
the case individually). 
 120 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) (explaining that “requiring the 
availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus cre-
ates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA”); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 1, § 1.4.1, at 
11; Barnes, supra note 2, at 329; Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 1. 
 121 Rice, supra note 6, at 248; Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 1. 
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of “clear and unmistakable” delegation to arbitrators, Chesapeake III has made 
it much more difficult for class action availability to be decided by arbitrators, 
which further inhibits the possibility of class action arbitration.122 
CONCLUSION 
Although arbitration is an efficient dispute resolution system, its current 
class action restrictions present a serious danger to citizens’ Due Process 
Rights. Consumers and employees, stuck in arbitration agreements that pre-
clude class arbitration, are finding themselves unable to effectively redress 
their legal claims. Although the Chesapeake III decision incentivizes contract 
clarity, it ignores the uneven bargaining powers in arbitration agreements. 
Thus, companies and employers, unlikely to add the “clear and unmistakable” 
language in their arbitration contracts, have become even further insulated 
from class action demands.  
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